Agency Shop Question by Hopfi, Charles E.
Cornell Law Review
Volume 49
Issue 3 Spring 1964 Article 4
Agency Shop Question
Charles E. Hopfi
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Charles E. Hopfi, Agency Shop Question , 49 Cornell L. Rev. 478 (1964)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol49/iss3/4
THE AGENCY SHOP QUESTION
Ckarles E. Hopflt
BACKGROUND OF THE AGENCY SHOP
In order to recognize adequately the services of the Union as the exclusive
bargaining agent of the employees in said unit, for the convenience of all
concerned and to make this agreement secure, the Company upon the
written request of the bargaining agent, namely, the Union, will collect
from each of such employees such sum as may be specified by the Union
for this purpose not in excess of $ ...... per employee per month .... 1
This quotation illustrates an agency shop clause. First appearing in
1940 when it was inserted in a labor contract,' it then went relatively
unnoticed until 1946 when it appeared in an arbitration case in Canada.3
Canadian Justice I. C. Rand ruled against a demand for a closed shop,
but permitted a requirement that all employees within the bargaining
unit pay a certain fee to the union regardless of whether or not they
were members of the union. This was an early manifestation of the idea
that nonunion employees could be required to pay a union for repre-
senting them. Since 1946, usage of the agency shop clause has increased
greatly and it has become a primary issue in the controversy over com-
pulsory unionism.
The agency shop is one of several forms of union security.4 Security,
which has slowly become one of the issues over which unions are most
t' B.S. 1957, N.Y.U.; LL.B. 1960, N.Y.U.; LL.M. 1961, N.Y.U. Formerly Attorney,
Federal Trade Comm'n; Counsel & Ass't Sec. of General Time Corp. Member of the New
York Bar.
1 Contract Between P. Lorillard Co. and Tobacco Workers Int'l Union (AFL) (1940).
2 Ibid.
3 Ford Motor Co. v. UAW, 1 Lab. Arb. 439 (1946); see Stark, "Union Security and Its
Implications," Annals 65-66 (Nov. 1946).
4 The types of union security, from strongest to weakest, are as follows:
(1) Closed shop-requires union membership at the time of hiring as a condition of
employment for the duration of the contract.
(2) Union shop-requires union membership after hiring as a condition of employ-
ment for the duration of the contract.(3) Preferential shop-requires the employer to give preference in hiring to union
members.(4) Agency shop-requires, as a condition of employment for the duration of the
contract, that a worker pay a fixed sum each month to defray expenses of the union,
whether or not he is a member of the union.
(5) Maintenance of membership-requires, as a condition of employment for the dura-
tion of the contract, union membership of (a) those who are members of the union
on a certain day and of (b) those who subsequently join the union.
(6) Maintenance of dues-requires that a union member's dues be checked off during
term of contract as a condition of employment. If he withdraws or is expelled from
the union, check-off continues but he cannot be discharged for loss of membership.
(7) Check-off-requires the employer to deduct union dues from union members' wages
for the benefit of the union.
(8) Harmony clause-employer agrees to encourage union membership without making
union membership a condition of employment.
Union Cont. Rep. ff 53121 (1961).
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concerned,5 exists in various degrees. Although the unions want the
strongest kind of security, they will often settle for much less. There is
no compromise, however, when it comes to the right to bargain for se-
curity; this, the unions feel, is a common-law right which must be
jealously guarded. 6
Prior to 1935, there were no limitations on the right to bargain for
union security. The National Labor Relations Act of 19357 restricted
the unions with which employers could enter into contracts requiring
compulsory membership to those which were not company dominated
and which represented a majority of the employees in an appropriate
unit. Section 7 of the Wagner Act guaranteed that employees would
"have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor or-
ganizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." Employers and
qualified unions still had freedom to select any form of union security
upon which they agreed.
In 1947 Congress amended section 7 of the Wagner Act by the Labor
Management Relations Act,8 which guaranteed the right of employees
to refrain from any or all such union activities. If an employee refrained
from union activity, the union's security would be endangered. To af-
ford the unions some protection union shops and maintenance of mem-
bership agreements were authorized in section 8(a) (3) of this new
legislation. Since employees and employers were not always willing to
give the unions maintenance of membership or union shop agreements,
the unions sought still other arrangements which would be more palat-
able yet would provide the type of security they wanted. Such arrange-
ments would not only have to be acceptable to both the employees and
the employers, but also would have to be legal. The only real alternate
arrangement was the agency shop. As it began to be used more fre-
quently, questions arose concerning its legality and its justification.
The rationale behind the agency shop was obvious. Although the em-
ployee could refrain from any and all union activities, the bargaining
agent was required to represent him without charge9 and "without
hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith."'01 Achiev-
5 "Another Year of Hard Bargaining," Business Week, Dec. 29, 1962, p. 47.
6 Matter of Public Serv. Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 418 (1950).
7 National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 8(3), 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(3) (1958) [hereinafter cited as Wagner Act].
8 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 7, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 151 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Taft-Hartley Act].
9 Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945); Hughes Tool Co., 104
N.L.R.B. 318 (1953).
10 Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323
U.S. 192, 204 (1944).
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ing and maintaining beliefits for its members cost money, and the unions
felt that if these same benefits were to be enjoyed by nonmembers, the
members were being penalized. The unions considered these nonmem-
bers to be free-riders and felt they should be forced to pay for the
union's representation."1 Although the nonmembers did not seek to have
the union represent them, and may be personally strongly opposed to
the union,12 the fact remains that they are benefited by the union's ac-
tivities along with the members.
If contributions from the nonmembers are required, however, the
payment should be only for those functions which benefit the non-
member. Unions use fees and dues for a variety of purposes. Since the
nonmember only gets the services of a bargaining agent he should not be
forced to pay for union institutional expenses, such as promoting legis-
lation or favorable political candidates, financing litigation or low cost
housing, and providing scholarships and charity to needy members.
Since the nonmember is only paying for the collective bargaining func-
tion, he should naturally only pay a portion of the fees and dues of the
member. Just as multilevel businesses must break down their various
cost factors and allocate them to numerous divisions and subsidiaries, so
must unions break down their costs so that members and nonmembers
can pay their fair shares. Although the accounting involved might be a
little burdensome, it is not an impossible task. This is especially true if
it provides a solution acceptable to the two contending parties-the
unions, who feel they should receive payment for representing non-
members, and the nonmembers, who feel that such payment should not
be required."3
The number of employees affected by this type of union security is
demonstrated by the following listing of some agency shop agreements.
In industry units, the Steel Workers have 164 agency shop agreements
covering approximately 111,000 employees, and the Rubber Workers
have fourteen agency shop agreements, covering 7,900 employees. 4 In
company units, unions have agency shop contracts with American Cable
and Radio, covering 1,350 employees; American Seating, covering 1,200
employees; Campbell Soup, covering 3,450 employees; Corn Products
Refining, covering 4,400 employees; Hershey Chocolate, covering 3,000
employees; Kelly Springfield, covering 1,750 employees; Ohio Edison,
11 Hearings Before the Select Committee of the Senate on Improper Activities in the
Labor or Management Field, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 10103 (1958) (remarks of Walter
Reuther).
12 It may be noted that dissenting nonmembers are effectively precluded from doing their
own negotiation. J. L Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
13 In Switzerland under an agency shop arrangement, nonmembers pay only approximate
costs of collective bargaining, normally around 50%. Dudra, "The Swiss System of Union
Security," 10 Lab. L.J. 165 (1959).
14 "Supreme Court asked to Review Agency-Shop Case," 51 Lab. Rel. Rep. 35 (1962).
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covering 1,550 employees; Pacific Maritime Association, covering 15,000
employees; Utah Power and Light, covering 1,350 employees; Western
Union Telegraph, covering 30,000 employees; and Wisconsin Motor
Company, covering 1,450 employees. 5
With the emergence of the agency shop, the question has arisen
whether the agency shop is a form of compulsory unionism and an allow-
able form of union security. Of the twenty states presently having right-
to-work provisions in their laws, twelve specifically ban the agency
shop,"8 three have court rulings that declare the provision illegal, 17 four
have rulings declaring the provision illegal or nonenforceable, 8 and one
state declares the agency shop clause legal.'9
The popularity of the agency shop is demonstrated by the fact that
only recently a difficult labor controversy was resolved by the negotia-
tion of an agency shop agreement.20 The National Labor Relations
Board cited this agreement as illustrative of the practicality of the
agency shop as a solution to an impasse between an employer and a
union over union security.2' Undoubtedly, demands will be pressed for
agency shop agreements with the aerospace companies in southern
California, where recent bids for union shop agreements were turned
down by the employees 2
15 Ibid. See generally Hammond & Nix, "Union-Status Provisions in Collective Agree-
ments, 1952," 76 Monthly Labor Rev. 383 (1953); Theodore, "Union Security Provisions in
Major Union Contracts, 1958-59," 82 Monthly Labor Rev. 1348 (1959); Theodore, "Union-
Security Provisions in Agreements, 1954," 78 Monthly Labor Rev. 649 (1955).
16 Ala. Code tit. 26, § 375(5) (1958); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 81-202 (1960); Ga. Code Ann.
§ 54-903 (1961); Iowa Code Ann. § 736A.4 (1946); Miss. Code Ann. § 6984.5 (Supp.
1960); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-217 (Supp. 1961); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 40-46.2 (Supp. 1960); Tenn.
Code Ann. § 50-210 (1955); Utah Code Ann. § 34-16-10 (Supp. 1961); Va. Code Ann.
§ 40-72 (1953); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-245.5 (Supp. 1963).
17 Baldwin v. Arizona Flame Restaurant, 82 Afiz. 385, 313 P.2d 759 (1957); Schermer-
horn v. Local 1625, Retail Clerks, 141 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1962), aff'd, 373 U.S. 746 (1963);
Higgins v. Cardinal Mfg. Co., 188 Kan. 11, 360 P.2d 456, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 829 (1961).
18 Nev. Att'y Gen., Opinion No. 407 (Sept. 22, 1958); S.D. Att'y Gen., Opinion (Sept. 3,
1958); Tex. Att'y Gen., Opinion No. WW1018 (March 14, 1961). These rulings hold the
agency shop to be illegal. N.D. Att'y Gen., Opinion (Jan. 13, 1956) (declaring that although
the agency shop might be legal, it is nonenforceable); see N.D. Att'y Gen., Opinion
No. 135 (Aug. 24, 1959).
19 Meade Elec. Co. v. Hagberg, 129 Ind. App. 631, 159 N.E.2d 408 (1959).
20 This controversy was between the Machinists Union and Douglas Aircraft Company.
In another controversy involving Boeing Company and the union, new workers did not
have to join the union but had to notify management and the union within 15 days after
commencing work; otherwise they had to join by the twentieth day.
21 "Supreme Court Asked to Review Agency-Shop Case," 51 Lab. Rel. Rep. 35 (1962).
22 On this issue, the unions expected at least 80% of the voters to support the union
shop instead of the necessary two-thirds. The voting showed, however, that not even two-
thirds of the employees in the following companies wanted union shops.
Percent of employees
Company voting for union shop
North American Aviation Inc. 59%
Convair Div., General Dynamics Corp. 54%
Ryan Aeronautical Co. 60%
"Is the Union Shop Losing Ground?" Business Week, Nov. 10, 1962, p. 144.
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Another question about the agency shop was raised by section 8 (a) (3)
of the Taft-Hartley Act, which outlawed the closed shop, but allowed
the union shop.23 The act provided, in section 14(b), that nothing in the
act permitting the union shop should be construed as authorizing such
agreements where they were prohibited by state law. This section led
to controversy as to whether the states should ban the union shop 24 and,
if they did ban it by passing a right-to-work law, whether the agency
shop would be banned by inference or whether it would have to be
named specifically.2 5
The right-to-work issue has reached the ballot or the legislatures in
at least forty states. Twenty have adopted right-to-work laws; four have
first adopted and then repealed them; and twenty states have rejected
them.26 In those states where the right-to-work law has been defeated or
has not been introduced, there is current planning to bring about its
passage. Right-to-work laws obviously interfere with union security, and
the unions view them as a real threat. Labor groups have announced
their plans to seek repeal of such state laws where they exist, or the
amendment of that portion of the federal law which permits their enact-
ment 2
7
While fighting to repeal the state laws having right-to-work provisions,
the unions have also tried to find a way to circumvent these laws. The
agency shop is by far the most popular method at this point. Clauses
allowing agency shops have been negotiated in some six per cent of all
contracts and the trend indicates that attempts will be made to negotiate
the clause in many more.2"
Today the agency shop clause is the center of a great deal of con-
troversy. This has been particularly true since January 1960 when a
new provision was added to steel company agreements. It provides that
employees in right-to-work states must pay a monthly service charge as
a contribution toward the administration of the agreement and the repre-
sentation of the employees. 29 The service charge happens to be the same
as the regular union dues. As a result of this agreement, the United
Auto Workers sought a similar arrangement from the General Motors
23 Taft-Hartley Act § 8(a) (3).
24 Sultan, Right-to-Work Laws: A Study in Conflict 56-61 (1958).
25 See Schermerhorn v. Local 1625, Retail Clerks, 141 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1962), aff'd,
373 U.S. 746 (1963); Higgins v. Cardinal Mfg. Co., 188 Kan. 11, 360 P.2d 456, cert. denied,
368 U.S. 829 (1961); Meade Elec. Co. v. Hagberg, 129 Ind. App. 631, 159 N.E.2d 408
(1959).
26 Politt, Right-to-Work Law Issues: An Evidentiary Approach 36 (1959); see notes
16-19 supra.
27 "New Drive Against Union Shop," Business Week, Nov. 4, 1961, pp. 145-46.
28 "Big Test for Agency Shop," id., Nov. 12, 1960, pp. 120, 122.
29 There has been a union shop arrangement in nonright-to-work states for some time.
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Corporation. The decision in the ensuing case3 ° called into question both
the growth and the very existence of agency shop agreements.3 '
Many people are affected by agency shop agreements, and much is at
stake in the agency shop controversy. Some of the more crucial questions
that have arisen involving the agency shop clause will be discussed in
this article.
THE AGENCY SHOP UNDER FEDERAL LAW
Congress was certainly aware of the existence of the agency shop
when it amended the Wagner Act in 1947,32 but whether it eliminated
the agency shop as a permissible form of union security with respect to
which unions and employers could exercise their freedom to contract is
another question. One can argue that it was not necessary for Congress
expressly to invalidate the agency shop because it accomplished the same
thing by not including it among the forms of union security specifically
permitted in section 8 (a) (3).
Another argument contends that since the right to enter into an agency
shop contract was an existing common-law right, and since this right
was not specifically taken away, it remained even though not expressly
authorized. Supporting this proposition is the rule of statutory construc-
tion which is generally stated as follows:
The courts, in construing these statutes, have held that the common
law will not be changed by doubtful implication ... and will be no further
abrogated than the clear import of the language necessarily requires. While
such statutes must be strictly construed, it is equally clear that the court
must ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent, and the construc-
tion must not be so strict as to lessen the scope plainly intended to be given
the statute, or to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature, as found in
the language actually used according to its true and obvious meaning; nor
can it be applied to change the meaning of the statute.
The courts will not presume that a change was intended by the legis-
lature unless the language used clearly indicates such intention, and, if the
statute makes an innovation in the common law, it will be presumed that
the legislature did not intend to make any innovation further than required
by the mischief to be remedied, or further than specified or clearly implied.33
This rule does not necessarily conflict with the first proposition. One
must decide whether the noninclusion of the agency shop as a permissible
30 General Motors Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 481, rev'd on rehearing, 133 N.L.R.B. 451 (1961),
enforcement denied, 303 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1962), rev'd, 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
31 Heineman v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 211 F. Supp. 76 (S.D. Cal. 1962); Grajczyk v.
Douglas Aircraft Co., 210 F. Supp. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
32 See Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 66-67 (1947) (remarks of Secretary of Labor Schwellenbach); Hearings Before
the Hpuse Committee on Education and Labor, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., vol. 3, at 1149, 1158,
1184 (1947) (remarks of Cecil B. DeMille); 93 Cong. Rec. 4887 (1947) (remarks of Senator
Taft).
33 82 CJ.S. Statutes § 393, at 94041 (1953).
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form of union security under section 8(a) (3) is sufficient to remove it
from its common-law protection. For an answer, one must look at the
committee reports connected with the compulsory union security provi-
sions.
Congress was very much aware of the agency shop in 1947 because
it heard testimony concerning it and other forms of compulsory mem-
bership agreements before passing the Taft-Hartley Act.34 The legisla-
tive history of the Taft-Hartley amendments shows that the contro-
versial issue of compulsory union membership was the problem which
received the greatest deliberation." Congress heard much testimony
about the abuses resulting from arrangements involving compulsory
membership in unions,36 and, as a matter of fact, it is difficult to find in
the legislative history any complaints against forms of union security
that are not based on compulsory membership.
In the Taft-Hartley amendments, Congress expressly permitted vol-
untary agreements requiring such forms of compulsory membership as
the unioni shop and the maintenance of membership shop, and it would
not have been a difficult task similarly to validate the agency shop. Con-
gress did not make any affirmative statements regarding the agency
shop, however, and thus the problem persisted. Senator Robert A. Taft
talked about free-riders, and explained section 8(a) (3) as eliminating
them to the extent that they would-be compelled to acquire membership
in a union as a condition of employment pursuant to a union shop or
maintenance of membership clause.3 7 Should the union be allowed to
further eliminate free-riders by conditioning employment upon the prac-
tical equivalent of union membership, namely, paying fees and dues?
The failure of section 8(a) (3) to mention the agency shop has been
mentioned as strong evidence that Congress wished not to legalize it.
3 8
Congress was most explicit in what it would allow; namely, the union
shop and maintenance of membership agreement, both of which required
membership in a labor organization as specified by section 8(a) (3).
Presumably, then, an agreement which required the same financial bur-
34 See authorities cited note 32 supra.
35 See S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1947); 93 Cong. Rec. 5089 (daily ed.
May 9, 1947) (remarks of Senator Hawkes); 93 Cong. Rec. 5088 (daily ed. May 9, 1947)
(remarks of Senator Donnell); 93 Cong. Rec. 3534-35 (daily ed. April 17, 1947) (remarks
of Rep. Hartley).
36 See 93 Cong. Rec. 5291 (daily ed. May 13, 1947) (remarks of Senator Kerr); 93
Cong. Rec. 5088 (daily ed. May 9, 1947) (remarks of Senator Taft); 93 Cong. Rec. 4496
(daily ed. May 1, 1947) (remarks of Senator Hawkes); 93 Cong. Rec. 4317 (daily ed.
April 29, 1947) (remarks of Senator Taft); 93 Cong. Rec. 3952-53 (daily ed. April 23,
1947) (remarks of Senator Taft).
37 93 Cong. Rec. 4887 (1947) (remarks on the floor of Congress).




den to the employees as a union shop, but did not require membership,
would not be allowed.
These divergent lines of reasoning continued to be separately cham-
pioned by labor and management. In an attempt to gain support for
their contentions, each group looked toward the courts for cases sub-
sequent to the Taft-Hartley amendments which might shed further
light on the agency shop question.
In Public Serv. Co.39 the NLRB held that the compulsory payment
of two dollars per month support money to a union by all the employees
in a bargaining unit as a condition of employment was not unlawful under
section 8(3) of the Wagner Act. But because the contract containing
the provision was executed before August 22, 1947, the effective date
of the Taft-Hartley Act, the saving clause in section 102 of this act pre-
served the legality of the support money provision since that provision
was valid under the Wagner Act. Hence, the Board did not consider the
provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act in deciding this case.
The next case presented to the NLRB was the American Seating
Co.4" case. The union, which had a basic agreement with the employer
requiring membership as a condition of employment, had allowed cer-
tain religious objectors who did not want to become union members to
make support money payments without joining the union. The union
had, in other words, waived the requirement of membership for certain
employees and had allowed them to continue working in the union shop
by merely paying support money in lieu of dues. The Board had no ob-
jection to the union allowing these objectors to stay on their jobs if they
paid the equivalent of membership dues and initiation fees.
A similar pair of cases appeared before and after the American Seat-
ing Co. case. First, in the case of Union Starch & Ref. Co.,41 two em-
ployees were willing to fulfill all their union obligations including be-
coming members. They objected, however, to swearing an oath of loyalty
to the union on religious grounds. This oath was a condition of member-
ship, and therefore they were dismissed. On appeal to the Board, they
were ordered reinstated because they were discharged for nonmembership
on some ground other than those allowed by the Taft-Hartley Act.4"
89 89 N.,.R.B. 418 (1950).
40 98 N.L.R.B. 800 (1952).
41 87 N.L.R.B. 779 (1949), approved, 186 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
815 (1951).
42 The Taft-Hartley Act, § 8(a) (3) states that:
[N]o employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for non-member-
ship in a labor organization . . .
(B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or
terminated for reasons other than failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues




Second, in the Marlin Rockwell Corp.43 case, the union sought to ob-
tain the discharge of some employees because they voluntarily resigned
from the union even though they continued to pay dues. The Board
cited the Union Starck44 case and stated that membership terminated
by voluntary resignation was membership "terminated for reasons other
than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues" '45 and there-
fore not grounds for a legal discharge.
These three cases all had factors in common. They occurred in states
where there were no right-to-work laws, and the controversy arose from
recognized forms of union security agreements under section 8(a) (3).
The mere fact that in these cases a slight variance was allowed to a few
employees who were willing to pay the equivalent of dues and initiation
fees, does not equate their situations with an agency shop. An agency
shop relationship was not contemplated by any of the parties, or the
Board; otherwise specific reference would surely have been made to it.
Finally, specific reference was made to agency shop agreements in a
series of cases involving General Motors and the United Auto Workers. 46
In these cases, the UAW had asked GM to bargain over terms of a
supplementary agreement. These terms required new employees, hired
after the agreement, to pay to the UAW a sum equal to the initiation
fee charged by each of its local unions, and a monthly sum equal to the
regular dues required of union members at each location. GM declined
to bargain over these terms because it felt that to do so would violate
the Taft-Hartley Act.
The union brought an unfair labor practice action against GM be-
cause of its refusal to bargain. In its first decision, the Board decided
that the agency shop was prohibited by federal law and thus GM need
not bargain.47 Shortly thereafter, however, the Board reversed itself.4"
The basic question presented to the NLRB was whether the agency
shop arrangement was one which is approved by section 8(a) (3) of the
Taft-Hartley Act, and whether it infringes upon the rights guaranteed
to employees in section 7 of the same act. Section 8 states:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership
43 114 N.L.R.B. 553 (1955).
44 Supra note 41.
4 Taft-Hartley Act § 8(a) (3).
46 General Motors Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 481, rev'd on rehearing, 133 N.L.R.B. 451 (1961),
enforcement denied, 303 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1962), rev'd, 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
47 130 N-L.R.B. 481 (1961).
48 133 N.L.R.B. 451 (1961).
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in any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in this Act, or in any
other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making
an agreement with a labor organization . . . to require as a condition of
employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the
beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement,
whichever is the later ....
Section 7 states:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and
shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except
to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as
authorized in Section 8(a) (3).
Ostensibly, the language of these sections indicates that the only type
of permissible infringement upon the rights of employees guaranteed
in section 7 is when continued employment is contingent upon member-
ship in a labor organization. Strict construction of this type of wording
had been advocated by both the United States Supreme Court and the
NLRB. The NLRB expressed such a view in the Bryan Mfg. Co.49 case.
It stated:
Union-security clauses authorized by the proviso clause of Section 8(a) (3)
are in derogation of the rights guaranteed employees in the definitive state-
ment of national policy contained in Section 7. That section emancipates
employees from coercion and restraint by labor and management alike. Their
right to engage in or refrain from concerted activity at their own election
has been enacted into law. But while that section enacted into law their
right to engage in or refrain from concerted activities at their election, the
proviso clause allows a contractual compulsion of union membership and
thus restricts the free choice otherwise provided by Sections 7 and 8(a) (3).
The authority so conferred by the proviso is, however, carefully circum-
scribed by conditions precedent to and by limits upon its exercise. As an
exception to declared public policy, a union-security clause, the conditions
under which it was executed, and action pursuant to it merit, when subject
to dispute, strict scrutiny. °
The Supreme Court had construed the restrictions of the first proviso
of section 8(3) of the Wagner Act in 1942.1 It stated:
The provision for a closed shop, as permitted by § 8(3), follows gram-
matically a prohibition of discrimination in hiring. These words of the
exception must have been carefully chosen to express the precise nature
and limits of permissible employer activity in union organization.
52
49 119 N.L.R.B. 502 (1957).
50 Id. at 510-11 (concurring opinion).
51 NLRB v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co., 315 U.S. 685 (1942).
52 Id. at 694-95.
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The principle spelled out was that exceptions to a general rule must
be strictly construed. With this principle in mind it is difficult to con-
strue the language of section 8 (a) (3) to allow agreements which require
something other than membership as a condition of employment. 5 s Never-
theless, as is explained presently, the Supreme Court did in fact find a
way around this difficulty.
Reiterating a bit, the NLRB initially declared that the agency shop
was prohibited by federal law.54 Due to the prodding of labor, the
Board decided to review its decision. Membership on the Board had
changed since the original decision earlier in the year5 5 and the new
majority felt no great compunction about overruling the initial deci-
sion. 6 It now thought that Congress wanted the agency shop embraced
within section 8(a) (3). It felt that the courts had construed congres-
sional intent the same way as it was now construing it and cited as sup-
port for its decision the Public Serv.,57 American Seating,58 Union
Starch,5 and Radio Officers'60 cases. The new Board disregarded the
reasoning adopted in its original decision and the facts which differenti-
ated the cited cases from the problem at land.6'
An appeal was taken to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals; this court
proceeded to reverse the new Board's decision. It based its action on the
wording of sections '7, 8(a) (1), and 8(a) (3), and section 14(b) of the
Taft-Hartley Act, and the definition of membership in section 3(o) of
the Landrum-Griffin Act.62 The court did not think that an agency shop
arrangement was a lesser form of union shop. Since there was no mem-
bership involved, it was an entirely different concept of compulsory
union security. Being a different concept, and one not specifically al-
lowed by section 8(a) (3) as was the union shop agreement, it could not
be bargained for by the union and the employer. The provisions, sup-
53 Boyd Leedom, chairman of the NLRB when it reached its original decision in the
General Motors case, and member of the NLRB when it reversed its decision in the re-
consideration, supported this view.
54 General Motors Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 481, rev'd on rehearing, 133 N.L.R.B. 451 (1961),
enforcement denied, 303 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1962), rev'd, 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
55 Frank W. McCulloch became the new chairman in the latter part of 1961, replacing
Boyd Leedom who remained as a member of the Board. Gerald A. Brown replaced Joseph
A. Jenkins who resigned.
56 General Motors Corp., 133 N.L.R.B. 451 (1961), enforcement denied, 303 F.2d 428
(6th Cir. 1962), rev'd, 373 U.S. 734 (1963); see Krock, "The 'Agency Shop' versus Taft
Act, Section 7," N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1961, p. 36, col. 4.
57 Public Serv. Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 418 (1950).
58 American Seating Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 800 (1952).
59 87 N.L.R.B. 779 (1949), approved, 186 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,'342 U.S.
815 (1951).
6o Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
61 Boyd Leedom wrote a dissenting opinion.




posedly, were clear, unambiguous, and were not subject to judicial con-
struction. The court reasoned that Congress would have provided for an
agency shop if it had wanted to approve such an arrangement, since it
had dealt specifically with various forms of organization that it would
allow to the unions.
The final answer was soon in coming. A decision rarely satisfies both
parties, and so the loser, in this instance the union, sought review by the
United States Supreme Court. Because of the importance of the agency
shop question, that Court decided to review the case and make a final
determination which would alleviate the dilemma that had befallen both
parties.
Men's minds often differ on questions of importance and there was no
exception with the agency shop. The Supreme Court could not accept the
findings of the court of appeals and adopted the reasoning of the second
NLRB decision; namely, that the agency shop was valid." This Court
envisioned a strong congressional declaration toward union security and
maintained that the amendments were intended to remedy only the most
serious abuses of compulsory union membership. Upon reflection it is
readily apparent that this Court's decision was not in keeping with
the general rule that strict construction of a statute should govern. In-
stead, it was saying that although membership was not actually obtained
in the agency shop, what was given was the equivalent of membership.
Since the equivalent of membership was given to the employees, the
agency shop was practically the same as a union shop and therefore al-
lowed by section 8(a) (3). The amendments found in the Taft-Hartley
Act served two purposes. They attempted to curb the serious abuses of
compulsory unionism and at the same time wanted the cost of collective
bargaining shared by as many employees as possible. Neither of the
purposes was thwarted by the agency shop.
Yet to be mentioned is the effect of the Supreme Court decision in the
General Motors case. Basically, the decision only affects states without
right-to-work laws except for the State of Indiana. As was described
earlier, the other nineteen states with right-to-work laws bar the agency
shop, specifically,64 by court decision,65 or by administrative opinion."
In the nonright-to-work law states, an agency shop is legal and can be
negotiated.
Since a majority of the Indiana employees of General Motors seem-
63 NLRB v. General Motors, 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
64 Note 16 supra.
65 Note 17 supra.
66 Note 18 supra.
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ingly wanted an agency shop, General Motors had to bargain with the
union concerning this problem. Prior to this Supreme Court decision,
General Motors contended that it would be in difficulty whether or not
its employees eventually joined the union because its negotiations with
the union for an agency shop had tended to encourage actual member-
ship in the union. Had not the Supreme Court stated 7 that if the en-
couragement of membership is a necessary and foreseeable consequence
of the employers' discriminatory acts, then the employer was in viola-
tion of section 8(a) (1) ?68 This contention fell by the wayside once the
Court decided that the agency shop was essentially equivalent to the
union shop. Under section 8(a) (3), the company could negotiate for a
union shop and now for its equivalent, the agency shop, even though the
latter could be proved to encourage formal membership.
Encourage formal membership it would. One Board member" recog-
nized that when union members received benefits over and above the
benefits received by nonmembers, the latter would be encouraged to seek
membership. A similar view was taken in the Gaynor News 7° case.
Another Board member 71 was impressed with the contents of the
UAW's Constitution, and with the testimony of the union's Vice Presi-
dent.72 The testimony showed that the Constitution was written with
only members in mind. Nonmembers could not participate in union
meetings, did not have the right to vote on ratification of agreements
negotiated by the union, did not have the right to vote on how dues were
to be allocated within the union, and could not, as a matter of right,
obtain the union's publication. The union decided whether nonmembers
received such things as strike benefits, the opportunity to participate in
programs for retirees, and educational benefits. The unions made.
all these decisions even though nonmembers were partially supporting
these activities with their money.78
The Constitution itself provided that local unions would cooperate
.7 Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1964).
68 The section states:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed in Section 7 of this title.
69 Joseph Alton Jenkins, member of the NLRB concurring in the original majority
decision disallowing an agency shop agreement. For a similar view, see Justice 1. C. Rand's
opinion in Ford Motor Co. v. UAW, 1 Lab. Arb. 439 (1946).
70 NLRB v. Gaynor News Co., 197 F.2d 719 (2d Cir. 1952), aff'd, 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
71 This was Arthur A. Kimball, a member of the NLRB concurring in the original
majority decision disallowing an agency shop agreement.
72 The UAW's Vice President in charge of the General Motors Department of the Union
was Leonard Woodcock. The testimony referred to was at the hearing of the union's
charges, held Feb. 10, 1960, in Detroit, Michigan, before Trial Examiner Albert P. Wheatley.
73 General Motors Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 481, rev'd on rehearing, 133 N.L.R.B. 451 (1961),
enforcement denied, 303 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1962), rev'd, 373 U.S. 734- (1963).
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with community groups where these groups existed, and would promote
and support programs benefiting retired members and other retired
workers. Portions of each month's dues were set aside by the local union
as a retired members' fund and turned over to the community groups.
The fund was earmarked by the Constitution to be used only to promote
and support programs benefiting retired members. There was no obliga-
tion for the locals to establish community groups where they did not
exist. If these groups did exist, they could only apply the union's con-
tributions to the benefit of retired members, not merely former contribu-
tors, of whom the nonmembers were a part.74
One must ask whether union membership should in fact be encouraged.
Certainly, Congress seemed to encourage membership when it passed its
latest labor legislation, known as the Landrum-Griffin Act,7 where Con-
gress enumerates certain rights guaranteed to members. 76 Section 3(o)
of the Landrum-Griffin Act defines "member" or "member in good stand-
ing" as "any person who has fulfilled the requirements for membership
in such organization." This section would seem to mean that the employ-
ees must actually be sworn union members and not merely pay dues.
Nonmembers, despite the fact that they would be required, in an arrange-
ment like the agency shop, to pay the equivalent of dues and fees re-
quired of members, would be wholly outside the guarantees of the act
because they are not specifically mentioned in the act.
In the sections guaranteeing rights,7 7 the nonmember would be inter-
ested in sections 101(a)(1)-(2), especially with regard to expressing
his views on business before the meeting. He would definitely be inter-
ested in meeting and assembling freely with other employees, who were
.members, and in voting on measures affecting his investment. Although
these rights would be vital to the nonmember, they would not be guar-
anteed to him; therefore, they might be taken away from him.
Section 101(a)(3)78 provides that union dues, initiation fees, and
assessments can only be increased by the secret vote of the union mem-
bers in good standing after reasonable notice of intention to vote on this
question. No issue would be more important to the nonmember than
this one, and he would want to be heard. But the act does not guarantee
the nonmember the right to be heard and again, the right might be taken
away and the nonmember left without any protection.
74 Ibid.
75 Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified in
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as Landrum-Griffin Act].
76 See 105 Cong. Rec. A8569 (1959) (comments of Senator Goldwater).
77 Landrum-Griffin Act tit. 1 [Bill of Rights of Union Members].
78 Landrum-Griffin Act § 101(a) (3).
19641
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
,Perhaps the solution lies in changing union constitutions and the
Landrum-Griffm Act to include benefits for nonmembers who pay the
fees and dues of members. If this change occurs, then it cannot be said
that a majority of fifty-one per cent can deprive the other forty-nine per
cent of their basic rights and benefits. In those states where compulsory
unionism can be obtained, and this includes the agency shops, perhaps
a rule should be passed which would require that all affected workers
must vote on the question. In this way we would follow the American
tradition of majority rule after freedom of choice.
STATUS OF STATE RiGHaT-To-WoRK LAWS NOT
SPECIFICALLY MENTIONING AGENCY SHOPS
At the time the NLRB was struggling with its agency shop problem,
a related question arose in the state courts of Kansas and Florida. In
Kansas, a group of nonunion employees was seeking an injunction against
the enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement containing an
agency shop.79 The union tried to obtain their discharge for failure to
pay the equivalent of dues, assessments, and fees. The trial court held
that the nonunion members' petition for an injunction did not state a
cause of action and the agency shop provision was ruled not to come
within the scope of the Kansas right-to-work law.
An appeal was taken to the Kansas Supreme Court which showed
that it recognized the philosophical problem involved in the case by
stating:
The issue of union security presented by this case brings into focus a
conflict between two firmly-held American beliefs: The belief that a
worker should not be required to support an organization which he may
oppose, and the belief that a worker should not be a "free rider" who takes
advantage of benefits secured by a union without contributing his share
to its support. That issue has been the subject of legislation at both the
state and national levels.80
Over the years, states have enacted laws that prohibit requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment. Con-
gress recognized the states' right to pass such laws in section 14(b) of
the Taft-Hartley Act where it provided:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the execution
or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization
as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such
execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law.
79 Higgins v. Cardinal Mfg. Co., 188 Kan. 11, 360 P.2d 456, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 829
(1961).
80 Id. at 16, 360 P.2d at 460.
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This section is directed at section 8(a) (3) of the same act which au-
thorizes agreements conditioning employment on membership in labor
organizations. Were it'not for section 14(b), states could not enact right-
to-work laws applicable to companies involved in interstate commerce
because the federal law would preempt the area.8' By removing the bar
imposed by preemption, states gained the right to enact right-to-work
laws, and some of them did. 2
Typical of these state laws was the one enacted by the people of the
state of Kansas as a constitutional amendment providing:
No person shall be denied the opportunity to obtain or retain employ-
ment because of membership or nonmembership in any labor organization,
nor shall the state or any subdivision thereof, or any individual, corpora-
tion, or any kind of association enter into any agreement, written or oral,
which excludes any person from employment or continuation of employ-
ment because of membership or nonmembership in any labor organization.83
The amendment did not refer to contracts requiring the payment of the
equivalent of dues to the union. It only prohibited the enforcement of
collective bargaining contracts that required membership or nonmember-
ship in labor organizations.
Aside from Kansas, of the nineteen states enacting right-to-work laws,
twelve expressly prohibited the collection of fees or charges without the
employee's consent. 4 It might have been that the other seven states did
not intend the prohibition of the collection of amounts in lieu of union
dues and fees. The opposite is true, however; six of these seven states
have prohibited agency shop provisions or rendered them unenforce-
able."'
As was discussed before, section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act ex-
pressly authorized states to adopt laws which outlaw agreements re-
quiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employ-
ment. Neither section 14(b) nor the Kansas amendment" contains any
81 Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 301
(1949).
82 Ala. Code tit. 26, §§ 375(1)-(7) (1958); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 23-1301 to -1307
(1956); Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 81-201 to -205 (1960); Fla. Const. § 12; Ga. Code Ann. §§ 54-
901 to -908 (1957); Ind. Ann. Stat. §§ 40-2701 to -2706 (Supp. 1963); Iowa Code Ann.
§§ 736A.1-.8 (1950); Miss. Code Ann. § 6984.5 (Supp. 1962); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-217
(Supp. 1961); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 613.230-.300 (1961); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 95-78 to -84
(1962); N.D. Cent. Code § 34-01-14 (1960); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 40-46.1 to -46.8 (1962);
S.D. Code § 17.1101 (Supp. 1960); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 50-208 to -212 (1955); Tex. Rev.
Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5207a, §§ 1-5 (1962) ; Utah Code Ann. §§ 34-16-1 to -18 (Supp. 1963) ;
Va. Code Ann. §§ 40-64, 40-68 to -70 (1950); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-245.1-.8 (Supp. 1963).
83 Kan. Const. art. 15, § 12 (enacted into law on Nov. 4, 1958).
84 These states were Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Iowa, Mississippi, Nebraska, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming.
85 Arizona, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, and Texas prohibit the agency shop; Indiana
and North Dakota allow it, but North Dakota does not allow such an agreement to be
enforced.
86 Kan. Coast. art. 15, § 12.
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specific provision forbidding agreements that require nonmembers to
pay union fees, dues, and assessments. The question is whether such a
prohibitory provision was necessarily implied. The Kansas Supreme
Court went along with other states in similar situations87 and ruled that
it was.88
Another problem confronting the Kansas court was whether it should
construe the constitutional amendment narrowly or broadly. In a prior
Kansas case, Clark v. Murray,9 the court had said:
When a resort to extrinsic evidence becomes necessary, in the construc-
tion of a statute, it is proper to consider the facts of contemporary history,
the previous state of the law, the circumstances which led to the enactment,
and especially the evil which it was designed to correct, and the remedy
intended. 0
The court had also stated that:
When the interpretation of a statute according to the exact and literal
import of its words would lead to absurd or mischievous consequences,
or would thwart or contravene the manifest purpose of the legislature in
its enactment, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding or modifying, so far as may be necessary, the strict letter of
the law.9'
Looking for further evidence that the amendment prohibited the agency
shop, the Kansas court looked for other views on the construction of
constitutional amendments. It felt that amendments dealt broadly with
general subjects, and it was wrong to give these general subjects narrow
or subtle interpretations. Should not amendments be construed to mean
what their language implied to the common man?
Joseph Story would have answered affirmatively to the above question.
In his treatise on the Constitution, 92 he stated:
Constitutions are not designed for metaphysical or logical subtleties, for
niceties of expression, for critical propriety, for elaborate shades of mean-
ing, or for the exercise of philosophical acuteness or judicial research. They
are instruments of a practical nature, founded on the common . . . wants,
designed for common use, and fitted for common understandings. The
people make them, the people adopt them, the people must be supposed to
read them, with the help of common-sense, and cannot be presumed to
admit in them any recondite meaning or any extraordinary gloss. 93
87 Note 85 supra.
88 Higgins v. Cardinal Mfg. Co., 188 Kan. 11, 360 P.2d 456, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 829
(1961).
89 Clark v. Murray, 141 Kan. 533, 41 P.2d 1042 (1935).
90 Id. at 536, 41 P.2d at 1044 quoting Black, Interpretation of Laws § 91 (2d ed. 1911).
91 Id. at 536, 41 P.2d at 1044 quoting Black, supra note 90, § 29. This was cited by
the court in Higgins v. Cardinal Mfg. Co., supra note 88, at 21, 360 P.2d at 464.
92 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (5th ed. 1891).
93 1 Id. at 345, also cited in State v. Sessions, 84 Kan. 856, 862, 115 Pac. 641, 643-44
(1911).
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The right-to-work amendment was ratified by the people of Kansas
to end forced membership in unions with resulting forced dues. Could
these dues still be demanded if the nonmember were not forced to join
the union? This would be the effect of the agency shop if the court al-
lowed it to exist. The court felt that the people had spoken clearly enough
and therefore answered "no" to the agency shop proposal. 4 The law was
such that any interpretation allowing the agency shop would have de-
feated the meaning given to this law by the common man. At this point
the Kansas court was the first court so to hold. Not until two years later
did it get the backing of the highest court in the land.95
In a similar case in Florida,96 four employees challenged the agency
shop clause in their company's contract with a Florida local of the Re-
tail Clerks International Association. The case, based on a section of the
state constitution,97 finally reached the Florida Supreme Court early in
1962. The Florida constitution states:
The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of
membership or nonmembership in any labor union, or labor organization;
provided, that this clause shall not be construed to deny or abridge the
right of employees by and through a labor organization or labor union
to bargain collectively with their employer.98
The court ruled that the working man was given the right to join, or not
to join, a labor union as he saw fit. He might make this decision without
jeopardizing his job. The Florida constitution had granted this right and
it could not be denied by an agency shop clause which would be repug-
nant to the constitution. If the agency shop clause were enforced, it would
require the nonunion employee to purchase from the labor union the
right that the constitution had already purported to give him. Yet, the
intent of the section was to leave for individual determination and
preference the question of whether one would derive any benefits from
an association with a labor union. It was the employee's choice to make
and could not be decided by anyone else.
As in Higgins v. Cardinal Mfg. Co.,9 the question of state court juris-
diction in this field was challenged. Both courts agreed that section 14(b)
expressly dealt only with agreements requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment. In their minds there was no
94 Higgins v. Cardinal Mfg. Co., 188 Kan. 11, 360 P.2d 456, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 829
(1961).
95 Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746 (1963).
96 Schermerhorn v. Local 1625, Retail Clerks, 141 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1962), aff'd, 373 US.
746 (1963).
97 Fla. Const. § 12.
98 Ibid.
99 Supra note 94, at 34, 360 P.2d at 473.
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question that the state courts could deal with this type of argreement.
Now, could Congress have preserved" the states' rights in right-to-work
legislation and presumably the right of state courts to interpret this
legislation while at the same time intending that unions and management
could, through an agency shop clause, circumvent these rights? Both
courts thought not.100 As is discussed presently, the Supreme Court ap-
proved this judgment. At that time, however, support for these decisions
was found in a decision by a federal district court' 01 which concluded
that section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act did give the states the power
to prohibit the agency shop as well as the union shop. It stated:
Section 14(b) would be bereft of meaning if we were to construe it in a
fashion which would render the states powerless to make illegal that type
of union security agreement which imposes liabilities on the workingman
which, realistically, are the same liabilities which, under the section, the
states may remove' 0 2
Usually right-to-work laws expressly banned the agency shop, but
when they did not do so, the positions of the states were that the law
prohibited the agency shop anyway, or that the agency shop was unen-
forceable.0 3 The only state that allowed the agency shop to survive by
court decision was Indiana. This case 0 4 might be examined to deter-
mine whether there were any special circumstances involved which
caused the court to rule as it did. The Indiana appellate court stated:
The above-quoted Right to Work Law contains a penalty provision.
The law is well settled that penal statutes will be strictly construed, and
not construed to include anything beyond its letter, though within its spirit,
and it cannot be enlarged by construction, implication or intendment beyond
the fair meaning of the language used. 10 5
Perhaps the court was saying that if a penal statute were not involved
it would construe the law more liberally, and probably hold that the
agency shop was banned.0 6 Because of this case, Indiana is the only
right-to-work law state which presently concurs with the Supreme
Court's decision holding the agency shop valid.1 7 With a penal provision
involved in a statute, however, the statute must be strictly construed. 08
100 Both the Florida court and the Kansas court relied on Weber v. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1954) and Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 301 (1949).
101 Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Las Vegas-Tonopah-Reno Stage Line, Inc.,
202 F. Supp. 726 (D. Nev. 1962).
102 Id. at 732.
103 See notes 16-19 supra.
104 Meade Elec. Co. v. Hagberg, 129 Ind. App. 631, 159 N.E.2d 408 (1959).
105 Id. at 639, 159 N.E.2d at 412. [Emphasis in original.]
106 Krock, "More Light on the Agency-Shop Legal Issue," N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1961,
p. 32, col. 4.
107 NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963).




Failure specifically to ban the agency shop has resulted in it, being
legalized.
The states without penal right-to-work statutes could decide whether
the exact wording of their statutes or amendments would defeat the
spirit that existed when they were enacted. If.this spirit were violated,
the courts had to decide whether to give a more liberal interpretation to
the wording. A liberal construction is always favored over a strict con-
struction of a statute if it does justice to the spirit of the law." 9 This
rule applies with even greater force to the interpretation of a constitu-
tional provision which, of necessity, is more general in its terms." 0
The unions naturally were dissatisfied with decisions ruling that the
agency shop was banned by particular state right-to-work laws. They
were most upset by the Florida and Kansas cases. An appeal of the
Kansas court decision"' was taken to the Supreme Court of the United
States. That Court, on October 9, 1961, refused to review the ruling
that the agency shop agreements were illegal under the state law, 12 and
the court's ruling remained binding upon the parties; each state had the
right to determine individually whether the agency shop was legal under
its law. With the recurrence of the conflict over the legality of the agency
shop arising from the Florida cases,"' the Supreme Court decided to take
a closer look at the whole situation.
The Supreme Court had just decided the General Motors case, where
it held that the agency shop was essentially equivalent to a union shop.114
If that be the case then consistency would require it to hold that a right-
to-work law, stating the rights of persons to work cannot be denied be-
cause of nonmembership in a labor union, bans the same membership
mentioned in section 8(a) (3). And consistency ruled. The Supreme
Court stated:
It follows that the General Motors case rules this one, for we there held
that the "agency shop" arrangement involved here-which imposes on
employees the only membership obligation enforceable under § 8(a) (3)
by discharge, namely, the obligation to pay initiation fees and regular
dues-is the "practical equivalent" of an "agreement requiring member-
ship in a labor organization as a condition of employment." Whatever may
be the status of less stringent union-security arrangements, the agency
109 Higgins v. Cardinal Mfg. Co., 188 Kan. 11, 360 P.2d 456, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 829
(1961).
110 The court in Taylor v. Hoisting Engineers Local, 189 Kan. 137, 368 P.2d 8 (1962)
agreed with this view.
:11 Higgins v. Cardinal Mfg. Co., supra note 109.
112 General Drivers Union v. Higgins, 368 U.S. 829 (1961) (denying certiorari).
113 Schermerhorn v. Local 1625, Retail Clerks, 141 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1962), aff'd, 373
U.S. 746 (1963).
114 Labor Board v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
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shop is within § 14(b). At least to that extent did Congress intend§ 8(a) (3) and § 14(b) to coincide.' 15
Finally, a decision was rendered. The states now have the right to ban
the agency shop,11 even when it is not specifically mentioned in the
right-to-work provision.
STATE COURT ENFORCEMENT OF
STATE LAWS BANNING THE AGENCY SHOP
Prior to 1947, Congress knew that some states had statutes that pro-
hibited the requirement that employees be members in, or make pay-
ments to, a labor union as a condition of employment. 1 7 When the Taft-
Hartley Act was promulgated in 1947, the report from the managers for
the House of Representatives recognized these state statutes as follows:
Under the House bill there was included a new section 13 of the National
Labor Relations Act to assure that nothing in the Act was to be construed
as authorizing any closed shop, union shop, maintenance of membership
or other form of compulsory unionism agreement in any State where the
execution of such agreement would be contrary to State law. Many States
have enacted laws or adopted constitutional provisions to make all forms
of compulsory unionism in those States illegal. It was never the intention
of the National Labor Relations Act, as is disclosed by the legislative
history of that Act, to preempt the field in this regard so as to deprive the
States of their powers to prevent compulsory unionism. Neither the so-
called "closed shop" proviso in section 8(3) of the existing Act nor the
union shop and maintenance of membership proviso in section 8(a) (3)
of the conference agreement could be said to authorize arrangements of
this sort in States where such arrangements were contrary to the State policy.
To make certain that there should be no question abofit this, section 13
was included in the House bill. The conference agreement, in section 14(b),
contains a provision having the same effect. 118
Recognizing that some states would have more restrictive laws than
others in regard to allowing unions to force employees to become mem-
bers and/or pay dues or lose their jobs, Congress felt that if these states
wished to pass such laws, it would not interfere.
A doctrine had developed under article VI of the federal constitution'"
115 Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 751-52 (1963).
116 John H. Fanning, a member of the NLRB, had stated before the Annual Association
of State Labor Relations Agencies that "the Board did not reach the question whether
the National Act authorized an agency shop in a state in which such provision is banned
under state law. This most difficult agency shop question is still to come." The Supreme
Court answered the question for the Board and the answer was the national act did not so
authorize an agency shop in this situation.
117 Statutes in Georgia, Iowa, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia forbad both
the union shop and the agency shop prior to the promulgation of § 14(b) of the Taft-
Hartley Act in 1947.
118 93 Cong. Rec. 6378 (1947).
119 Article VI of the United States Constitution reads: "This Constitution, and the Laws
of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . .shall be the supreme
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that when Congress passed a law on a matter within its jurisdiction, it
preempted the field. It deprived the states of jurisdiction over matters
covered in the law regardless of whether the state laws coincided with,
were complementary to, or were in opposition to federal law.' 20 As such,
congressional action in a specific area, such as in the area of union se-
curity, would prohibit the states from promulgating and enforcing their
own legislation in the same area.' 2' The federal government can, how-
ever, legislate to allow states to act in areas where it would normally be
deemed to have preempted the field. Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley
Act is such legislation.2 2
In Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Bd.1as the United States Supreme Court said:
Other provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act make it even clearer than the
National Labor Relations Act that the States are left free to pursue their
own more restrictive policies in the matter of union-security agreements.
Because § 8(3) of the new Act forbids the closed shop and strictly reg-
ulates the conditions under which a union-shop agreement may be entered,§ 14(b) was included to forestall the inference that federal policy was to
be exclusive. 124
The federal government expressly yielded to the states when they
sought to enact right-to-work laws, and it would seem natural that state
courts be granted authority to process violations of such laws. As logical
as this conclusion seems, the question was in doubtl s until the Supreme
Court agreed with this reasoning in Retail Clerks v. Schermerorn.12A
In ruling that the agency shop was valid under section 8(a) (3)'1 t the
Court had followed the view of the NLRB. In the General Motors2 8
case, the Board had decided that the agency shop was valid, and the Su-
preme Court affirmed this decision. In the Schermerhorn case, the Board
did not have an opportunity initially to assess the agency shop arrange-
ment under section 14(b). Were it not for the General Motors129 case
Law of the Land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
120 Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1947).
121 See Local 24, Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959); Bus Employees v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v.
Georgia, 234 U.S. 280 (1914).
122 Gregory, Labor and the Law 539 (2d ed. rev. 1961) agrees with this view.
123 336 U.S. 301 (1949).
124 Id. at 313-14.
125 It was in doubt because it could be argued that if there was a violation of a state
union security law authorized by § 14(b) it was a federal unfair labor practice to be
remedied by the federal system.
11 373 U.S. 746 (1963).
127 Labor Board v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
ss General Motors Corp., 133 N.L.R.B. 451 (1961), enforcement denied, 303 F.2d 428
(6th Cir. 1962), rev'd, 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
129 General Motors Corp., supra note 128.
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CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
preceeding the Schermerkorn case and coming to the Board with con-
nected issues and via the proper judicial route, the Supreme Court could
easily have reversed the Schermerhorn case on procedural grounds.
The Court tackled the question of the state's right to enjoin the op-
eration of an agency shop arrangement which the state had declared to
be unlawful. It had to sidestep its decision in San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council v. Garmon130 which held that actions arguably under either sec-
tions 7 or 8 of the act'31 were actions which were within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the NLRB. It did so by deciding that problems relating
to section 14(b) were in a special category. While uniformity was a goal
which Congress sought in the field of labor relations, the promotion, of
uniformity was abandoned in dealing with the various state laws barring
the enforcement of union security agreements.
While acknowledging the state court's right to enforce a state law
barring the agency shop or other union security arrangements, the
Court made clear that state power, recognized by 14(b), arose only
after the contract between the employer and union authorizing the
agency shop was signed. If an attempt was made to enjoin the negotiation
and execution of such an agreement prior to its being completed, the
state courts would not have jurisdiction; only the Board could act in
this situation. Employees and other interested parties would have to
wait until the contract was completed in order that they could seek an
injunction in the state courts which usually were more sympathetic to
their cause. Even if the union were picketing for an agency shop in viola-
tion of a state's union security statute, the employer or employee would
have to wait until after such a contract was executed in order to air their
grievances before the state court.'32 The-Court did not consider the prac-
tical problems involved in waiting until after an agreement was signed.
Better labor relations can be maintained if a proposal is rejected before,
rather than after, it becomes part of a contract.
Giving the state courts this limited right to enforce laws barring union
security arrangements once the agreements are actually made effectuates
the congressional intent to allow a number of attitudes and philosophies
on the subject of compulsory unionism. There is nothing wrong with
this approach because compulsory unionism is a subject touching on
the very principles of democracy on which this country was founded.
180 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
131 Taft-Hartley Act.
132 Local 438, Construction Union v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542 (1962); Local 429, Electrical
Union v. Farnsworth & Chambers Co., 353 U.S. 969 (1957).
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AGENCY SHOP
Whether a person must join a. union in order to work because a simple
majority so desires is not an easy question to answer.
CONCLUSIONS
The legality of the agency shop as a form of union security has been a
controversial issue for some time. It the last few years, great progress
has been made in clarifying'this area of uncertainty which vitally effects
the welfare of a significant portion of American managemfient' and labor.
The agency shop has been declared allowable under federal law. In states
which have right-to-work laws, the agency shop is banned whether or
not it'is specifically mentioned, except when the right-to-w6rk law con-
tains penal .provisions and the agency shop -is not specifically banned.
Finally, the state courts can enjoin the operation of an agency sho1
arrangement which the state has declared to be unlawful providing- the
arrangement has been made.
No doubt the unions consider section 14 (b) the cause of their problems
with the agency'shop arrangement. Congress can certainly expect the
unions to seek its repeal. Whether the union's efforts wil1 be successful
or will lead to compromise legislation, only time will tell. It is this au-
thor's opinion that compromise legislation will result. Legislation which
would limit payments, by a nonmember, to the union for services ren-
dered as bargaining agent would be just. The nonmember has, and always
will, accept the gains obtained by the bargaining agent for him and he
cannot complain if he is called upon to bear his share of the expense.
Auditing procedures could be set up to ensure that the expense was prop-
erly allocated.
It is to the benefit of all employees whose bargaining agents are unions
that their agents are financially sound.. A union with uncertain or inad-
equate financing would be a weak and timid representative and would.be
unable to carry out its function of representing the employees in an equi-
table manner. Knowing that it is supported by all, members and non-
members, the union can maintain a responsible attitude throughout 'its
dealing with the management; an attitude so important to the further
development of the national economy.
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